CS代考 Chapter Three

Chapter Three
Name letters, Predicates, Variables and Quantifiers
1 NAME LETTERS AND PREDICATES
In chapters 1 and 2 we studied logical relations that depend only on the sentential connectives: ‘~’, ‘→’, ‘∧’, ‘∨’, ‘↔’. The atomic sentences — those that contain no connectives — were symbolized by sentential letters, and we paid no attention to any internal structure that they might have. It is now time to study that structure. The Predicate Calculus is a system of logic that studies the ways in which sentences are constructed out of name letters, predicates, variables, and quantifiers, as well as connectives. We have already studied connectives; in this section we introduce name letters, predicates, variables, and quantifiers.

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In our logical symbolism, name letters are written as the small letters: a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h (and with subscripts, such as ‘c3’). Any small letter between ‘a’ and ‘h’ can be used as a name letter. Name letters in the logical symbolism correspond to names of English:
Carlos, Agatha, Dr. Samuelson, Ms. Bernstein, Madame Curie, , San Diego, Germany, UCLA, General Electric, Microsoft, Google, Macy’s, The Los Angeles Times, I-405, Memorial Day, the FBI, …
Any one of these may be symbolized by means of a name letter:
c California
g General Electric
The simplest way to make a sentence containing a name letter is to combine it with a one-place predicate. One-place predicates appear in our logical symbolism as the capital letters from A to O (and with subscripts, such as ‘G2’). One-place predicates correspond roughly to grammatical predicates in English; in the following examples, the underlined phrases would be symbolized as one-place predicates:
Agatha is clever.
Henry is a giraffe.
Ferdy dances well. Georgia is a state
Ann will run for re-election.
(The parts that are not underlined are symbolized with name letters.)
Whereas English proper names are usually capitalized, the logical name letters that represent them are not, and whereas English predicates are typically not capitalized, the logical predicates that represent them are capitalized. There is nothing “logical” about this reverse convention; it is an historical accident, but it has now become part of the tradition of symbolic logic Further, in the usual formulations of the predicate calculus the predicate comes before the name letter, instead of after it as in English. This, too, is an historical accident. So the sentences given above can be symbolized as follows:
Agatha is clever. Ca Henry is a giraffe. dances well. Df Georgia is a state. Ag Ann will run for re-election. Ea
CHAPTER 3 SECTION 1
A one-place (“monadic”) predicate is any capital letter between ‘A’ and ‘O’ (optionally with a numerical subscript).
A name letter is any small letter from ‘a’ to ‘h’ (optionally with a numerical subscript).
An atomic sentence may be formed by writing a one-place predicate followed by a name letter.
Chapter Three — 1
Version of Aug 2013

1. Symbolize each of the following sentences:
a. Fred is an orangutan.
b. Gertrude is an orangutan but Fred isn’t. c. will speak first.
d. Gary lost weight recently; he is happy. e. Felix cleaned and polished.
f. Darlene or Abe will bat clean-up.
We assume that a one-place predicate is true of certain things, and that a name letter stands for a unique thing. A sentence consisting of a one-place predicate together with a name letter is true if and only if the predicate is true of the thing that the name letter stands for. Thus, taking the examples listed above, we assume that ‘C’ is true of all and only clever things, that ‘a’ stands for Agatha (presumably a person or animal), and then:
is true if and only if Agatha is one of the clever things that the predicate is true of. Similarly, if `G’ is true of giraffes, then `Gh’ is true if Henry is one of the giraffes. If `E’ is true of the things that will run for re-election, and if ‘a’ stands for Ann, then `Ea’ is true if and only if Ann will run for reelection.
Predicates are generally true of several specific things, but a predicate might be true of only one thing (‘is a moon of the earth’) or might not be true of anything at all. If there are in fact no dragons, the sentence:
Df Fred is a dragon
contains a predicate ‘D’ that is true of nothing at all. This means that the sentence `Df’ will be false, no
matter who or what `Fred’ stands for.
In this chapter we assume that each name letter in our logical symbolism stands for a unique thing. This assumption is an idealization, for it is not true that the words of English that we are representing by name letters always succeed in naming something. If there is no such person as , then ` ‘ is a “name” that names nothing at all. In some systems of logic it is possible to use name letters which do not stand for anything; these systems of logic are called “free logics”. (They are called “free” because they are “free of” the assumption that the name letters they contain actually stand for things.) Free logics are a bit more complicated than standard logic. (Studies of free logic assume that the reader is already acquainted with the standard logic taught here.) In this text we assume that any name letter that we use stands for something.
Chapter Three — 2 Version of Aug 2013
CHAPTER 3 SECTION 1
2. Symbolize each of the following, assuming:
`D’ is true of doctors
‘L’ is true of people who are in love ‘h’ stands for Hans
‘a’ stands for Amanda
a. Hans is a doctor but Amanda isn’t.
b. Hans, who is a doctor, is in love
c. Hans is in love but Amanda isn’t
d. Neither Hans nor Amanda is in love
f. Hans and Amanda are both doctors.

CHAPTER 3 SECTION 1
3. Symbolize each of the following, using:
a. Eileen and Cosi both live in Brea.
b. Eileen drives to school, and so does Hank.
c. If Hank lives in Brea then he drives to school; otherwise he doesn’t drive to school. d. If David and Hank both live in Brea then David drives to school but Hank doesn’t. e. Neither Hank nor Eileen live in Brea, yet each of them drives to school.
‘L’ for things that live in Brea
‘D’ for things that drive to school
2 QUANTIFIERS, VARIABLES, AND FORMULAS
So far, we have no means at all in our symbolism to express generalities. We can say that Pedro is a doctor, and we can say that Pedro is wealthy, but we cannot say that everyone is a doctor, or that every doctor is wealthy. Nor can we deny that everyone is a doctor, or say that some doctor isn’t wealthy. We cannot even express these claims. In order to express generalities we will introduce quantifiers and variables.
Here is how we use quantifiers. Suppose that we wish to say — as some philosophers have said — that everything in the universe is either mental or physical. Suppose that `M’ is the one-place predicate `is mental’, and `H’ is the one-place predicate `is physical’. Then we symbolize the claim that everything is either mental or physical as follows:
∀x(Mx ∨ Hx).
The initial `∀x’ is a universal quantifier phrase. This is followed by something, `(Mx ∨ Hx)’, which we will call a symbolic formula. A formula is just like a symbolic sentence except that instead of a name letter following each predicate we may have a variable, such as `x’ above. The displayed formula says that everything satisfies a certain condition. The universal quantifier is responsible for the “everything” part, and the combination of variables and predicates tells us what the condition is. In the case in point, the condition is that it is either mental or physical:
∀x (Mx ∨ Hx)
Everything it is either mental or physical is such that
Variables: Any small letter from ‘i’ to ‘z’ is a variable; also small letters between ‘i’ and ‘z’ with numerical subscripts.
The universal quantifier sign is ‘∀’. The existential quantifier sign is ‘∃’.
A quantifier is either quantifier sign followed by a variable: ∀x ∀z ∀s ∃x ∃z ∃s
Chapter Three — 3 Version of Aug 2013

An existential quantifier can appear in a formula in the same place that a universal quantifier may appear: ∃x (Mx ∨ Hx)
Something it is either mental or physical is such that
In order to construct sentences in our new extended notation, we begin by defining what a symbolic formula is. Intuitively, a symbolic formula is like a sentence, except that it may contain variables in places where name letters otherwise would appear. We use the word ‘term’ to cover both name letters and variables.
Terms: Any name letter or variable is a term.
So ‘a’ and ‘x’ are both terms. A formula is built up in steps, as follows:
Sentence letters: Any sentence letter is an atomic formula.
Both ‘Henry is a giraffe’ and ‘x is a giraffe’ are symbolized as atomic formulas:
Here are some molecular formulas:
~Gh ~Gx (Gx ∧ Fa) (Gx ∨ Jc) (Gh → Jy) (~Fa ↔ Ga) → Hx
We can also make formulas out of other formulas by “generalizing” them with quantifiers:
Examples of quantified formulas are:
∀xGx ∃xFx ∀y(Gy→Fy) ∃w~(Gw ∧ ~Fb) ∀v(~Jx ↔ Fv)
Once a quantified formula is constructed, it may be used as input to any of these provisions. So, given that the examples above are formulas, we can make new formulas by combining them with connectives:
(∀xGx ∧ ∃xFx) (∃xFx ∨ ∀y(Gy→Fy)) ∀y(Gy→Fy) (P ∧ ∃xFx)
CHAPTER 3 SECTION 2
Atomic formulas: A one-place predicate followed by a term is an atomic formula. Thus, if F is a one-place predicate and ‘a’ is a name letter, then ‘Fa’ is an atomic
If ‘F’ is a one-place predicate and ‘x’ is a variable then ‘Fx’ is an atomic formula.
Molecular formulas: If □ and ○ are formulas, then the following are molecular formulas:
~□ (□∧○) (□∨○) (□→○) (□↔○)
Quantified formulas: If □ is a formula, and ‘x’ is a variable, then these are quantified
Chapter Three — 4 Version of Aug 2013

We may informally omit parentheses exactly as we did in the last chapter, to produce informal notation: ∀xGx ∧ ∃xFx ∃xFx ∨ ∀y(Gy→Fy)
(Note that ‘∀yGy→Fy’, is a conditional; it is not equivalent to ‘∀y(Gy→Fy)’, which is a universal generalization of a conditional.)
Likewise, we can add a quantifier to a formula that already has one or several quantifiers within it: ∀x(Gx → ∃yFy) ∀x~∃y(Gx ∨ ~Fy) ∀x∀y∀z(Gx → Fz)
Every formula is either atomic, or it has a main connective or a quantifier with scope over the whole formula. The main connective or quantifier in a formula is the last connective or quantifier that was added in constructing the formula. Formulas may be parsed as in chapters 1 or 2. Some examples are:
∀x(Gx → ∃yFy) ∀x~∃y(Gx ∨ ~Fy) ||
(Gx → ∃yFy) ~∃y(Gx ∨ ~Fy)
∃yFy ∃y(Gx ∨ ~Fy) ||
(Gx ∨ ~Fy) 2
CHAPTER 3 SECTION 2
A formula is anything that can be constructed by means of the above provisions for atomic formulas, molecular formulas, and quantified formulas.
Nothing else is a formula.
1. For each of the following, say whether it is a formula in official notation, or in informal notation, or not a formula at all. If it is a formula, parse it.
a. ~∀x(Fx → (Gx ∧ Hx)) b. ∃x~~Gx → Hx ∨ ∃yGy c. ~(Gx ↔ ~Hx)
d. ∀xGx ∧ ∃Hx
e. Fa→(Gb↔Hc)
f. ∀x(Gx↔x∨Ha)
g. ∀x(Gx↔Hx)→Ha∧∃zKz
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Version of Aug 2013

3 SCOPE AND BINDING
In the following we will need to distinguish a symbol from an occurrence of that symbol. For example, the formula:
contains one variable, the variable ‘x’, which occurs twice in the formula. It has one occurrence as part of the quantifier, and one occurrence immediately following the predicate ‘F’. It will be important to be able to say when an occurrence of a quantifier binds an occurrence of a variable. This can be given a precise explanation in terms of the scope of an occurrence of a quantifier. The scope of an occurrence of a quantifier includes itself along with the formula to which it was prefixed when constructing the whole formula. Here are some occurrences of quantifiers and their scopes, indicated by underlining. (The line immediately under a quantifier occurrence indicates its scope.)
∀x(Fx → Gx)
∃xFx ∧ ∃y(Gy ∧ Hy) ∃x(Fx ∧ ∀yGy)
∃x(Fx ∧ ∃y(∃zGz ∧ Hy))
Using the notion of the scope of a quantifier, we can say when a quantifier occurrence binds an occurrence of a variable in a formula:
(Notice that a variable occurrence that is part of a quantifier is automatically bound by that quantifier.) The arrows here indicate which variables are bound by the quantifier:
∀x(Fx → Gx)
The initial quantifier binds both occurrences of ‘x’ because (1) they are within its scope, (2) they are the same letter as the one in the quantifier itself, and (3) they are not already bound by another quantifier in the formula. These examples are similar:
∃xFx ∧ ∃y(Gy ∧ Hy) ∃x(Fx ∧ ∀yGy)
∃x(Fx ∧ ∃y ( ∃zGz ∧ Hy))
CHAPTER 3 SECTION 3
A quantifier occurrence binds an occurrence of a variable if
the variable occurrence is within the scope of the quantifier occurrence
the variable occurrence is the same letter as the one in the quantifier occurrence the variable occurrence is not already bound by another quantifier occurrence within the scope of the first quantifier occurrence
Chapter Three — 6 Version of Aug 2013

∃x(Fx ∧ ∃y ( ∃zGz ∧ Hy ∧ Hx))
The following example illustrates a case in which an occurrence of ‘x’ (the last one) is not bound by the initial quantifier ‘∃x′, even though it is within its scope. This is because there is another quantifier inside that already binds that occurrence of ‘x’:
∃x(Fx ∧ ∃x ( ∃zGz ∧ Hx))
Using the notion of a quantifier binding an occurrence of a variable, we can define what a sentence is:
A sentence is any formula in which every occurrence of a variable in the formula is bound by an occurrence of a quantifier in the formula.
A variable occurrence that is not bound is called “free”. So a sentence can also be defined as a formula that contains no free occurrences of variables.
All of the examples given above are sentences. The following formulas are not sentences because certain occurrences of variables in them are not bound any of their quantifiers:
CHAPTER 3 SECTION 3
∀x(Fy → Gx)
∃xFx ∧ ∃y(Gx ∧ Hy) ∃x(Fx ∧ ∃y (∃zGz ∧ Hz))
∃x(Fx ∧ ∃x(∃zGz ∧ Hy))
no quantifier contains ‘y’
the scope of the initial quantifier does not include the second ‘x’ the scope of the quantifier with ‘z’ does not extend far enough no quantifier contains ‘y’
1. For each of the following, say whether it is a sentence, a formula that is not a sentence, or not a formula at all. (Include sentences and formulas in informal notation as sentences and formulas.) If it is a sentence or formula, indicate which quantifiers bind which variables.
a. ∃x(Fx ∧ ∀y(Gy ∨ Hx))
b. ∃y(Hy ∧ ∃~zHz)
c. ∃z~(Hz ∧ Gx ∧ ∃xIx)
d. ~(~Gx → ∀y(Jx ∧ Ky ↔ Lx))
e. ∃xGx ↔ ∃y(Gy ∧ Hx)
f. ∀x(Gx → ∀y(Hy → ∀z(Iz → Hx ∧ Gz)))
g. ∀x∃y(Hx ↔ ~Gy)
h. ∀xy(Gx ∧ Hy → Kx)
i. ∀x(Gx∧∃y→Hx∧Jy)
j. ∀x∃y∀z(Gx ↔ ∃w(Hw ∧ ~Hx ∧ Gy))
Chapter Three — 7 Version of Aug 2013

4 MEANINGS OF THE QUANTIFIERS
CHAPTER 3 SECTION 4
What do quantifiers mean? This can be answered indirectly by giving a way to read symbolic formulas in English. We already know how to read the parts of formulas without quantifiers or variables; we have:
Gh ∧ Ea Gh → Ea
Henry is a giraffe
Ann with run for reelection
Henry is a giraffe and Ann will run for reelection.
If Henry is a giraffe then Ann will run for reelection.
We can read a quantified formula by adding these provisions:
Here are some examples:
Read any universal quantifier as “everything is such that”, while reading any variable that it binds as a pronoun which has the ‘everything’ as its antecedent.
Read any existential quantifier as “something is such that” while reading any variable that it binds as a pronoun which has the ‘something’ as its antecedent.
∃x(Gx ∧ Ex) ∀x(Gx → Ex)
everything is such that it is a giraffe
something is such that it is a giraffe and it will run for reelection everything is such that if it is a giraffe then it will run for reelection
These readings are stilted, and sometimes cumbersome. But they are accurate paraphrases of the symbolic notation. Often there are more natural ways to word an English sentence. For example, these are all equivalent:
∃x(Gx ∧ Ex)
something is such that it is a giraffe and it will run for reelection something is a giraffe which will run for reelection
some giraffe will run for reelection
Likewise, these are all equivalent:
∀x(Gx → Ex)
everything is such that if it is a giraffe then it will run for reelection everything, if it is a giraffe, will run for reelection
every giraffe will run for reelection
As in the case of connectives, we need to distinguish carefully between the official definition of the quantifiers and the question of how best to read them in English. The official definition of the quantifiers has to do with the truth-values of the sentences that are produced using them:
Definitions of the quantifiers
To tell whether or not a sentence of the form ∀x(…x…x…) is true:
Remove the initial universal quantifier. Pretend that the variable it was binding is a name letter. If you now have a sentence that is true no matter what the pretend name stands for, then the original sentence is true; otherwise it is false.
To tell whether or not a sentence of the form ∃x(…x…x…) is true:
Remove the initial existential quantifier. Pretend that the variable it was binding is a name letter. If there is something that the pretend name could stand for such that the sentence you now have is true, then the original sentence is true; otherwise it is false.
Chapter Three — 8 Version of Aug 2013

To apply this to the example ‘Everything is either mental or physical’: Begin with the sentence:
∀x(Mx ∨ Hx).
Erase the initial quantifier, yielding:
Now pretend that `x’ is a name letter, and ask ourselves:
Is `Mx ∨ Hx’ true no matter what `x’ stands for?
If the answer is yes, then the original sentence `∀x(Mx ∨ Hx)’ is true;
otherwise `∀x(Mx ∨ Hx)’ is false.
This test explains why we read `∀x(Mx ∨ Hx)’ in English as `Everything is either mental or physical’. It is because the test for the truth of `∀x(Mx ∨ Hx)’ succeeds if everything is indeed either mental or physical, and it fails if not everything is either mental or physical. To see that this is so, compare the meaning of the English sentence with the official statement of the conditions under which the symbolized version is true:
Suppose that certain philosophers are right, and everything is either mental or physical. Then if we treat `x’ as a name letter, the phrase `Mx ∨ Hx’ must be true no matter what `x’ stands for. Because it can only stand for something that is mental or physical (that’s all there is), and if it stands for something mental the first disjunct is satisfied, and if it stands for something physical then the second disjunct is satisfied.
Suppose on the other hand that not everything is either mental or physical. (Suppose, as some philosophers have argued, that the number 4 is neither a mental thing nor a physical thing.) Then if we treat `x’ as a name letter, we will not find that the phrase `Mx ∨ Hx’ is true no matter what `x’ stands for. For if `x’ stands for the number 4, neither disjunct will be satisfied.
These considerations do not settle the question of whether everything is either mental or physical. Instead they show that there is an equivalence between the truth-value, in English, of the sentence `Everything is either mental or physical’, and the truth-value, according to our official account, of the predicate calculus sentence `∀x(Mx ∨ Hx)’.
CHAPTER 3 SECTION 4
a. ∀x(Gx → Fx) b. ∀x(Gx → Cx) c. ∃x(~Fx ∧ Gx)
d. ∃y(Fy ∧ Cy)
e. ∃z(Gz ∧ Cz)
f. ∀x(Gx → ~Gx)
1. Suppose that `A’ stands for `is a sofa’, `B’ stands for `is well-built’ and `C’ stands for `is comfortable’. For each of the following sentences, produce an accurate but “cumbersome” reading in English as well as a natural idiomatic reading if possible.
a. ∃x(Ax ∧ Bx) b. ∀x(Ax→B

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