程序代写代做代考 Java html ER graph C game Complex Dynamical Networks: Lecture 5: Spreading Dynamics

Complex Dynamical Networks: Lecture 5: Spreading Dynamics
EE 6605
Instructor: G Ron Chen
Most pictures on this ppt were taken from un-copyrighted websites on the web with thanks

Epidemic Spreading
Typically through contact

Diseases Spreading
In Human Society

新冠肺炎

COVID-19 @ Hong Kong

Example
Dengue Fever (登革熱)

Example
Dengue Fever

Example: H1N1
12

H1N1 Flu
Airport network Commuting network
Human Mobility Networks in Europe Data

H1N1 Flu
Human Mobility Networks in USA Data

Spanish Flu
1918 influenza pandemic (Jan. 1918 – Dec. 1920; known as Spanish Flu) was an unusually deadly influenza pandemic, the first of the two pandemics involving H1N1 influenza virus
It infected 500 million people around the world. About 50~100 million (3~5% of world population at the time) died
It was one of the deadliest Epidemics in human history
1920: World population ~ 1900 million
100m/1900m ~ 5% died !

Coming Again?

2015 In Hong Kong …

2016 In Mainland

2017 In Hong Kong

2018 In India

2019 In India

2019 In Hong Kong …

Recall History
Epidemics in Hong Kong
 Bubonic Plague 鼠疫 (1894–1929)
 H1N1 (1918-1919)
 H2N2 (1957-1958)
 H3N2 “Hong Kong flu” (1968-1969)
 H1N1 Influenza (2009)
 SARS (2003)
 COVID-19 (2019-2020)

Recall History
Epidemic Spreading
CityU of HK, 2003

SARS — First Major New Infectious Disease of the 21st Century
 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) is a highly infectious and potentially lethal atypical form of pneumonia that begins with deceiving common flu-like symptoms
 On 16 November 2002, the first known case of SARS was discovered in Guangdong province in southern China
 The number of reported SARS cases has increased exponentially, prompting the World Health Organization (WHO) to issue a global alert on 12 March 2003

Epidemic Spreading
Typically through contact …
Human Travel Map:

Epidemic Spreading
Human Travel Map:
春运

AIDS in USA

Example: AIDS Epidemics
t3 t3 t3
t2
t2
t
exponential
t (years)
Szendroi & Czanyi, Proc. Royal Society of London, B 2004
 New York – Hom
 New York – Het
 San Francisco – Hom
 South Africa  Kenya
 Georgia  Latvia
 Lithuania
Cumulative number

In China …

In China …

In China … and in the World

Internet
Computer Viruses

Computer Virus Spreading
 The first virus capable of infecting PCs was perhaps the Brain virus developed in Pakistan in 1986.
 I-Love-YoubugbeganinPhilippinesonMay4,2000,andspreadacross the world in one day (traveling through Hong-Kong to Europe then to USA), infecting more than 78 million computers worldwide in just 4 days, i.e., about 10% of all computers connected to the Internet, and causing about US$5.5 billions in damage.
 Itwasestimatedthatthereweremorethan48,000identifiedvirusesonthe Internet worldwide in year 2000 alone.
 In 2000-2001, well-known viruses: Lover Letter, Nimda, and Sircam …
 It was estimated that more than 80% computers were attacked by viruses in
China in 2004.
 Also in 2004, the infamous Worm Sasser attacked several hundred
thousands of computers over the world within just a couple of weeks.
 In 2009, Conficker (worm) remotely installs software on infected machines.
 …… Many other examples … still today!

Computer Virus Spreading
Hong Kong
10 Most Dangerous Computer Viruses of All Time

More Examples …
In 2008, for example, security software maker “Symantec in Mountain View” in California detected 1.6 million new threats from computer viruses and other malicious software (In 2007, only 600,000 or so)
Such attacks will become more common and more sophisticated in the future
Statistically, unsolicited junk e-mails (‘spams’) accounts for about 90–95% of all e-mails sent
Such trash will become more common and more annoying in the future [Computer Viruses]

Computer Viruses and Worms
 Computer viruses are usually referred to as some small computer programs that can reproduce themselves by infecting other programs and computers, which continuously grow and spread out.
 When a virus is active inside a computer, it is able to copy itself in many different ways into the codes of some programs of the computer.
 When the infected computer program is run into another computer, typically the code of the virus is executed first thus continues to infect other programs in the new computer.
 This process repeats endlessly, leading to the collapse of a local or even global network of computers eventually, causing tremendous technological and economical disasters.

Computer Viruses and Worms
Major computer viruses may be roughly classified into:
 Boot-sector viruses, which infect the boot sectors of floppies and hardware devices
 File viruses, which infect application programs
 Macro viruses, which infect data files directly
 Hybrid types of viruses, in a certain combination of the above basic ones, which infect some special technologies or applications such as Java, ActiveX, and HTML, etc.
 Trojan horses are malicious file or program, which can make copies of themselves, steal information, or harm their host computer systems

Computer Viruses

Malicious Emails and URLs referring to CODVID-19
Data: McAfee Labs report

Trojan
43

“Achilles’ Heel”
Corfu, Greece
2004 film: TROY 特洛伊
Trojan Horse
木马
Story

Robustness and Fragility of Scale-Free Networks
“Achilles’ heel”
R. Albert, H. Jeong, A. L. Barabasi, Nature, 406, 387-482 (2000)
In Greek mythology, when Achilles was a baby, his mother Thetis took him to the River Styx, which was supposed to offer powers of invulnerability, and dipped his body into the water. But as mother held Achilles by the heel, his heel was not washed over by the water of the magical river. Achilles grew up to be a man of war who survived many great battles. On one day, a poisonous arrow shot at him was lodged in his heel, killing him shortly after.

Computer Viruses and Worms
 The first computer worm was created in 1988 by the now-infamous Robert Tappan Morris
 On November 2, 1988, Robert Morris, Jr., a graduate student in Computer Science at Cornell, wrote an experimental, self-replicating, self-propagating program called a worm and injected it into the Internet.
 Computer worms are most aggressive cyber-organisms (larger and more sophisticated programs) with much more powerful abilities to attack computers.
 They shut down the Internet e-mail systems that got clogged with infected e-mails propagating from the worm.
 A worm is capable of sending itself to all e-mail addresses in the e- mail address book of the computer, which received an infected e- mail. This makes worms very effective in spreading over the Internet.

Incidents on Facebook
Facebook Malware

Incidents on Facebook

网络安全问题
2016 年10月21日,美国东海岸出现了大面积互联网断网事件, 大半个美国的网络服务瘫痪。
据360全球网络攻击实时监测预警系统的跟踪监测显示:导致这 场灾难的原因是黑客入侵,控制了全世界十多万台智能硬件设 备,组成了僵尸网络,对美国互联网域名解析服务商DYN进行 DDoS攻击。
十多万台设备被控制发起的攻击已经让半个美国的互联网瘫痪, 数十亿设备如果被控制则足以让全球互联网瘫痪。
October 21, 2016, USA:
> 100000 computers hacked  1⁄2 Internet down

In China …

In China …
安全报告

In China …
安全报告

In CityU There was an incident before

Another Example
Flame (malware)
Flame, also known as Flamer, sKyWIper, or Skywiper, is modular computer malware discovered in 2012 that attacks computers running the Microsoft Windows operating system.
Reportedly, the program is being used for targeted cyber espionage (spy) in some middle eastern countries.
June 19, 2012, Washington Post published an article that Flame was jointly developed by U.S. National Security Agency, CIA and Israel’s military at least five years ago as part of a classified effort code-named Operation Olympic Games to collect intelligence in preparation for cyber-sabotage aimed at slowing Iranian nuclear efforts.

 Typical examples:  Milessa (1999)
 I-Love-You (2000)  Nimda (2001)
 Win32/Sircam (2001)  Chinese versions:
 Worm.Klez.cn.b (2002)  Worm.SoBig.c (2003)  Worm.Mimail.C (2003)  SCO bomb (2004)
 ……
Node-degree distribution of the email network
Spreading of Email Viruses
in Kiel University, Germany, 2002
N = 59812 k  2.88 Ebel et al (2002)
  1.81

Computer Viruses seem to be Decreasing For many good reasons:
• Modern software has embedded virus protection modules
• Operating systems have stronger ability to resist viruses
• Antivirus software becomes much more powerful •……

Epidemic Models

Epidemic Models
(recovered individuals are permanently immune)

Logistic Equation
I(t) 1
0

SIS Model

SIS Model

SIS Model

SIR Model

SIR Model

SEIR Model
SE (with latency)I
more models

Virus Spreading Threshold

Epidemic Threshold on Homogenous Networks 
v 
(t) t
ki  k
(t)

Epidemic Threshold on Homogenous Networks 
t
 0    c
     c     c
c 
1
k
M. Boguna, R. Pastor-Satorras, A. Vespignani (2003):
“Epidemic spreading in complex networks with degree correlations”.

Epidemic Threshold on Scale-Free Networks The virus spreading equation
is modified to:
Here, k (t) is the probability of an edge connecting to
an infected degree-k node.
Solution:   k()
k 1k()
Threshold:   k c k2
Higher-degree nodes have higher probabilities to be infected
M. Boguna, R. Pastor-Satorras, A. Vespignani (2003):
“Epidemic spreading in complex networks with degree correlations”.
as N    
k c 0

Epidemic Threshold on Scale-Free Networks Random graphs
 is the spreading rate c is the threshold
 Classical theory: c > 0
 Scale-free network: c = 0
(Pastor-Satorras, 2001)
Scale-free networks

Immunization on Scale-Free Networks
 Since scale-free networks are fragile to virus attacks, causing wide and serious outbreak, immunization becomes especially important for this type of networks
There are three effective immunization strategies:
Random Immunization (or, Uniform Immunization) Targeted Immunization (or, Selective Immunization) Acquaintance Immunization

Random Immunization
Let the immunity (density of immunized nodes) be denoted by g Random immunization strategy: the immunization threshold is
gc 1c 
where c  k is the effective epidemic threshold, giving k2
k k2
Clearly, Nk2 c 0gc 1
 in order to immune a scale-free network, almost every node
has to be immunized
 random immunization for scale-free networks is inefficient and
gc 11 
expensive
Satorras and Vespignani (2003)

Targeted Immunization
Targeted immunization strategy: to immune the most highly connected nodes, thereby reducing or completely blocking virus spreading
For BA scale-free networks, the immunization threshold is
2 gc ~e m
a very small immunization threshold can be obtained for a very large range of effective spreading rate 
 for scale-free networks, targeted immunization has a much smaller immunization threshold than random immunization, hence is more effective
Satorras and Vespignani (2003)

Acquaintance Immunization
Idea: 1.2.3.……
2. immune its biggest neighbor
1. randomly select one node
3. immune its biggest neighbor

Immunization on Scale-Free Networks
Acquaintance immunization strategy:
To randomly select a fraction of nodes from the population, and for each node in the fraction select a biggest one of its neighbors for immunization
empty circles – random
empty triangles – acquaintance
empty diamonds – two-acquaintance empty squares – targeted

BREAK
10 minutes

Power Networks Black Out Cascading Failures …

Domino Effect
DEMO

Cascading Reactions and Failures
Epidemics
Power Grids
Similarities
cascading reactions and spreading
cascading reactions and spreading
Differences

Real Examples of Cascading Failures
Internet
Power grid
October 1986: the first documented Internet collapse due to congestion
August 1996: sag of just one electric line in Oregon USA
August 2003: local failure in Ohio USA
Drop in speed of a factor 100
Largest blackout in the US history
Blackout affected 4 million people in 9 different states

Some Typical Incidents of Power Blackouts Data Source
12 Biggest Power Blackouts in History

Snapshot: 15 August 2003 Power Blackout
Before blackout
Satellite images
Reference
During blackout

A detailed map
black out

Hong Kong ?

Will It Happen Again ?
… 1959, 1961, 1965, 1977, 2003, … … 2019, 2020, 2021 ? Major Power Blackout Records

Unfortunately, the answer is YES
2012 India
Power blackout caused traffic jam

2015 Pakistan

2019 Venezuela

2019 New York

2019 New York

2019 London

2019 Argentina

Why?
Cascading Failures on Scale-Free networks

Power-Law Exponents in some Real Networks

Power Grid Cascading Failures
DEMO

Demo: California
Black – normal Red – crash Blue – failure

Power Network Cascade Modeling
First failed node

It load will be shared by other

Newly overloaded nodes fail

Cascading Failures: Models and Analysis 

k  x k 1 fk(x) e(x/)k
k and  areconstant parameters
Cumulativedistributionfunction: 1e
(x/)k
Recall:
Weibull distribution

Fiber-Bundle Model Built on a BA Network
P(i ) 1e(i )
Power-law distributions of degree-k nodes for small  Moreno et al. (2002)

Fiber-Bundle Model
Fraction of connected sub-nets
less severe
(network not collapses unless 40% nodes are disconnected)
more severe
(whole network collapses even when only 10% nodes are disconnected)
= random graph
BA scale-free network: N = 10,000 Moreno et al. (2002)
P(i ) 1e(i )
Completely collapse

Node-Betweenness Model Replace “load capacity” by “node-betweenness”
Motter et al. (2002)
Scale-free network model AS-level real Internet
G is the fraction of remaining connected sub-nets over the whole network [square curves correspond to random node failures, star curves to largest-degree node
failures, and circle curves to biggest-betweenness node failures]
Observation1: smallertolerancemoreseverefailure
Observation 2: largest-degree/betweenness failures is more severe than random failures

Node-Betweenness Model
Comparison of cascading failures on random networks
square – random attack, circles – intentional attack. N = 5,000
Observation 1: For random graphs, both random and intentional attacks perform similarly
k3
Motter et al. (2002)

Node-Betweenness Model
Motter et al. (2002)
Comparison of cascading failures on scale-free networks square – random attack, circles – intentional attack. N = 5,000 k  3
Observation 2: For scale-free networks, intentional attacks are more severe than random attacks

Cascading Failures: Models and Analysis Models Based on Edge Dynamics
Consider loads on edges Let s be the number of
overloaded edges
Let P(s) be the cumulated failures (normalized)
Let be the average edge loading over the whole network
Moreno et al. (2003)

Cascading Failures
A model based on both node and edge dynamics eij [0,1] – efficiency of
edge (i,j), e.g., bandwidth E – average efficiency:
E(G)  1 eij N ( N  1) i  j
— loading ii
Li(t)
C L(0)–capacity
 1
a) ER network, b) BA network. [squares — random node failures, circles — biggest node failures]
— tolerance Crucitti et al. (2004)

AS-level Internet (Real Data)
Random failures
intentional attacks
Crucitti et al. (2004)

US Power Grid (Real Data)
random failures
intentional attacks
Crucitti et al. (2004)

Interdependent Networks

Interdependent Networks
Network of Networks in the real world
Example: human mobility networks
short-range interconnected flows by cars, trains, ferries, etc. long-range commuting flows like air-flights
communication network flows (phones and the Internet).
Interdependent Networks of human mobility in the North America
blue – short-range brown – long-range
Vespignani, Nature (2010) 464: 984-985

A Real-World Example: Italy Blackout in 2003
a One power station failed (red)  a few associated Internet servers failed (red), and some Internet servers are isolated (green)
b The above failed Internet servers (red) and associated edges are removed  related power stations failed (red), and some power stations became isolated (green)
c The above failed power stations (red) and Internet servers (red) are removed  both networks failed (both red)  system collapsed Buldyrev et al. Nature (2010) 464: 1025-1028

Cyber-attack to Power Grids
On 23 December 2015

Cyber-attack to Power Grids

Power Grid Cascading Failures
Models, AnalysisPrevention, Control
Sample Books

End