Consumers
Microeconomic Theory -24- Uncertainty
© John Riley November 12, 2018
Choice under uncertainty
Part 1
1. Introduction to choice under uncertainty 2
2. Risk aversion 15
3. Acceptable gambles 19
Part 2
4. Measures of risk aversion 25
5. Insurance 30
6. Efficient risk sharing 33
7. Portfolio choice 47
Microeconomic Theory -25- Uncertainty
© John Riley November 12, 2018
4. Measure of risk aversion
Remark: Linear transformations of Von Neumann utility functions ( )v x
Consider 1 2( ) ( )u x k k v x
1 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 2[ ( )] ( ) ( ) ( ( )) ( ( ))u x u x u x k k v x k k v x
1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2( ( )) ( )) [ ( )]k k v x v x k k v x
Thus the ranking of lotteries is identical under linear transformations
Absolute aversion to risk
The bigger is
( )
( )
( )
v w
ARA w
v w
the bigger is
( )
( ) ( )
( ) 4 4
v w x x
ARA w
v w
.
Thus an individual with a higher ( )ARA w requires the odds of a favorable outcome to be moved
more. Thus ( )ARA w is a measure of an individual’s aversion to risk.
( )ARA w degree of absolute risk aversion
Examples:
1/2( ) 3v x x , ( ) lnv x x ,
1( ) 6 2v x x
1
( )
2
ARA x
x
1
x
2
x
Microeconomic Theory -26- Uncertainty
© John Riley November 12, 2018
Relative risk aversion
Betting on a small percentage of wealth
New risky alternative: 1 11 2 1 2 2 2ˆ ˆ( , ; , ) ( (1 ), (1 ); , )w w w w .
Choose so that the consumer is indifferent between gambling and not gambling.
Note that we can rewrite the risky alternative as follows:
1 11 2 1 2 2 2ˆ ˆ( , ; , ) ( , ; , )w w w x w x where ˆx w .
**
Microeconomic Theory -27- Uncertainty
© John Riley November 12, 2018
Relative risk aversion
Betting on a small percentage of wealth
New risky alternative: 1 11 2 1 2 2 2ˆ ˆ( , ; , ) ( (1 ), (1 ); , )w w w w .
Choose so that the consumer is indifferent between gambling and not gambling.
Note that we can rewrite the risky alternative as follows:
1 11 2 1 2 2 2ˆ ˆ( , ; , ) ( , ; , )w w w x w x where ˆx w .
From our earlier argument,
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) 4 ( ) 4 ( ) 4
v w x v w w wv w
v w v w v w
.
*
Microeconomic Theory -28- Uncertainty
© John Riley November 12, 2018
Relative risk aversion
Betting on a small percentage of wealth
New risky alternative: 1 11 2 1 2 2 2ˆ ˆ( , ; , ) ( (1 ), (1 ); , )w w w w .
Choose so that the consumer is indifferent between gambling and not gambling.
Note that we can rewrite the risky alternative as follows:
1 11 2 1 2 2 2ˆ ˆ( , ; , ) ( , ; , )w w w x w x where ˆx w .
From our earlier argument,
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) 4 ( ) 4 ( ) 4
v w x v w w wv w
v w v w v w
.
Relative aversion to risk
The bigger is
( )
( )
( )
wv w
RRA w
v w
the bigger is
( )
( ) ( )
( ) 4 4
wv w
RRA w
v w
.
Thus an individual with a higher ( )RRA w requires the odds of a favorable outcome to be moved
more. Thus ( )RRA w is a measure of an individual’s aversion to risk.
( )RRA w degree of relative risk aversion
Microeconomic Theory -29- Uncertainty
© John Riley November 12, 2018
Remark on estimates of relative risk aversion
( )
( )
( )
wv w
RRA w
v w
. Typical estimate between 1 and 2
Remark on estimates of absolute risk aversion
( ) 1
( ) ( )
( )
v w
ARA w RRA w
v w w
Thus ARA is very small for anyone with significant life-time wealth
Microeconomic Theory -30- Uncertainty
© John Riley November 12, 2018
5. Insurance
A consumer with a wealth ŵ has a financial loss of L with probability 1 . We shall call this outcome
the “loss state” and label it state 1. With probability 2 11 the consumer is in the “no loss state”
an label it state 2.
With no exchange the consumer’s state contingent wealth is
1 2
ˆ ˆ( , ) ( , )x x w L w .
This consumer wishes to exchange
wealth in state 2 for wealth in state 1.
Suppose there is a market in which such an
exchange can take place. For each dollar of
coverage in the loss state, the consumer must pay
dollars in the no loss state.
1 2
ˆ ˆ( , ) ( , )x x w L q w q
Microeconomic Theory -31- Uncertainty
© John Riley November 12, 2018
The steepness of the line is rate at which the consumer
must exchange units in state 2 for units in state 1
So is a market exchange rate.
Then if there were prices for units in each state
1
2
p
p
Suppose that the consumer purchases q units.
1
ˆx w L q
1
2
2
ˆ ˆ
p
x w q w q
p
1 1 1 1
ˆ( )p x p w L p q
2 2 2 1
ˆp x p w p q
Adding these equations,
1 1 2 2 1 2
ˆ ˆ( )p x p x p w L p w
Slope =
Microeconomic Theory -32- Uncertainty
© John Riley November 12, 2018
The consumer’s expected utility is
1 1 2 2( ) ( )U v x v x
We have argued that the consumer’s
choices are constrained to satisfy the
following budget constraint
1 1 2 2 1 2
ˆ ˆ( )p x p x p w L p w .
This is the line depicted in the figure.
Group Exercise: What must be the price ratio
if the consumer purchases full coverage? (i.e. 1 2x x )
Implicit budget line though the “endowment”
Slope =
Microeconomic Theory -33- Uncertainty
© John Riley November 12, 2018
6. Sharing the risk on a South Pacific Island
Alex lives on the west end of the island and has 600 coconut palm trees. Bev lives on the East end
and has 800 coconut palm trees. If the typhoon approaching the island makes landfall on the west
end it will wipe out 400 of Alex’s palm trees. If instead the typhoon makes landfall on the East end of
the island it will wipe out 400 of Bev’s coconut palms. The probability of each event is 0.5.
Let the West end typhoon landfall be state 1 and let the East end landfall be state 2. Then the risk
facing Alex is 1 12 2(200,600; , ) while the risk facing Bev is
1 1
2 2
(800,400; , ) .
What should they do?
What would be the WE prices if they could trade state “contingent claims” provided by competitive
insurance companies (in effect, market makers)?
What would be the WE outcome?
Microeconomic Theory -34- Uncertainty
© John Riley November 12, 2018
Let ( )Bv be Bev’s VNM utility function so that
her expected utility is
1 1 2 2( ) ( ) ( )
B B B B
B BU x v x v x .
where s is the probability of state s .
In state 1 Bev’s “endowment “ is 1 800
B
In state 2 the endowment is 2 400
B .
*
line
400
800
Microeconomic Theory -35- Uncertainty
© John Riley November 12, 2018
Let ( )
hv be Individual h ’s utility function so that
h ’s expected utility is
1 1 2 2( ) ( ) ( )
h h h h
h hU x v x v x .
where s is the probability of state s .
In state 1 Bev’s “endowment “ is 1 800
B
In state 2 the endowment is 2 400
B .
The level set for ( )
B BU x through the
endowment point
B is depicted.
At a point ˆ
Bx in the level set the steepness
of the level set is
1 1 1 1
2 2 2
2
ˆ( )
ˆ( )
ˆ( )
B
B B
B B B
B B
B
B
U
MU x v x
MRS x
UMU v x
x
.
Note that along the 45 line the MRS is the probability ratio 1
2
(equal probabilities so ratio is 1).
line
400
800
slope =
Microeconomic Theory -36- Uncertainty
© John Riley November 12, 2018
The level set for Alex is also depicted.
At each 45 line the steepness of the
Respective sets are both 1.
Therefore
( ) 1 ( )B B A AMRS MRS
Therefore there are gains to be made from
trading state claims.
The consumers will reject any proposed exchange
that does not lie in their shaded superlevel sets.
line
400
800
line
600
200
Microeconomic Theory -37- Uncertainty
© John Riley November 12, 2018
Edgeworth Box diagram.
Bev will reject any proposed
exchange that is in the shaded sublevel set.
Since the total supply of coconut palms is
1000 in each state, the set of potentially
acceptable trades must be the unshaded
region in the square “Edgeworth Box”
400
800
Microeconomic Theory -38- Uncertainty
© John Riley November 12, 2018
The rotated Edgeworth Box
Note that
A B and ˆ ˆA Bx x
Also added to the figure is the green level set
for Alex’s utility function through
A .
**
400
800
200
600
Microeconomic Theory -39- Uncertainty
© John Riley November 12, 2018
The rotated Edgeworth Box
Note that
A B and ˆ ˆA Bx x
Also added to the figure is the green level set
for Alex’s utility function through
A .
Any exchange must be preferred by both consumers
over the no trade allocation (the endowments).
Such an exchange must lie in the lens shaped
region to the right of Alex’s level set and to the left
of Bev’s level set.
*
400
800
200
600
Microeconomic Theory -40- Uncertainty
© John Riley November 12, 2018
The rotated Edgeworth Box
Note that
A B and ˆ ˆA Bx x
Also added to the figure is the green level set
for Alex’s utility function through
A .
Any exchange must be preferred by both consumers
over the no-exchange allocation (the endowment).
Such an exchange must lie in the lens shaped
region where both are better off.
Pareto preferred allocations
If the proposed allocation is weakly preferred by both consumers and strictly preferred by at least
one of the two consumers the new allocation is said to be Pareto preferred.
In the figure ˆAx (in the lens shaped region) is Pareto preferred to A since Alex and Bev are both
strictly better off.
400
800
200
600
Microeconomic Theory -41- Uncertainty
© John Riley November 12, 2018
Consider any allocation such as ˆAx
Where the marginal rates of substitution
differ. From the figure there are exchanges that
the two consumers can make and both
have a higher utility.
400
800
Microeconomic Theory -42- Uncertainty
© John Riley November 12, 2018
Consider any allocation such as ˆ̂
Ax
Where the marginal rates of substitution
differ. From the figure there are exchanges that
the two consumers can make and both
have a higher utility.
Pareto Efficient Allocations
It follows that for an allocation
Ax and B Ax x
to be Pareto efficient (i.e. no Pareto improving allocations)
( ) ( )A A B BMRS x MRS x
Along the 45 line 1
2
( ) ( )A A B BMRS x MRS x
.
Thus the Pareto Efficient allocations are all the allocations along 45 degree line.
Pareto Efficient exchange eliminates all individual risk.
400
800
Microeconomic Theory -43- Uncertainty
© John Riley November 12, 2018
Walrasian Equilibrium?
Suppose that insurance companies act as competitive intermediaries (effectively market makers) for
people who want to trade the commodity in one state for more of the commodity in the other state.
Let sp be the price that a consumer must pay for delivery of a unit in state s , i.e. the price of “claim”
in state s.
A consumer’s endowment 1 2( , ) , thus has a market value of 1 1 2 2p p p . The consumer
can then choose any outcome 1 2( , )x x satisfying
p x p
Given a utility function ( )h su x , the consumer chooses
hx to solve
{ ( , ) | }h hh
x
Max U x p x p
i.e.
1 1 2 2{ ( ) ( ) | }
h h h h
h hhx
Max v x v x p x p
FOC: 1 11 1
2 22 2
( )
( )
( )
h
h h
h
h
h
v xMU p
MRS x
MU pv x
Microeconomic Theory -44- Uncertainty
© John Riley November 12, 2018
Example: (200,600)
A , (800,400)B , 1 41 2 5 5( , ) ( , )
Group exercises
1. What is the WE price ratio?
2. What is the WE allocation?
3. Normalizing so the sum of the price is 1, what is the value of each plantation?
4. What is the profit of the insurance companies?
Class exercise
1. What ownership of plantations would give the two consumers the WE outcome?
2. Could they trade shares in their plantations and achieve this outcome?
Microeconomic Theory -45- Uncertainty
© John Riley November 12, 2018
Class (or group) Exercise: What if the loss in state 1 is bigger than in state 2
Suppose ( ) ln
h hv x x and the aggregate endowment is 1 2( , ) . Then 1 2 .
What are the PE allocations?
Hint: Consider the Edgeworth-Box.
Class Question: What does the First Welfare Theorem tell us about the WE allocation?
Given this, what must be the WE price ratio.
Microeconomic Theory -46- Uncertainty
© John Riley November 12, 2018
6. Portfolio choice
An investor with wealth Ŵ chooses how much to invest in a risky asset and how much in a riskless
asset. Let 1+ 0r be the return on each dollar invested in the riskless asset and let 1 r be the return on
the risky asset (a random variable.) If the investor spends x on the risky asset (and so Ŵ x on the
riskless asset) her final wealth is
0
ˆ( )(1 ) (1 )W W x r x r
**
Microeconomic Theory -47- Uncertainty
© John Riley November 12, 2018
7. Portfolio choice
An investor with wealth Ŵ chooses how much to invest in a risky asset and how much in a riskless
asset. Let 1+ 0r be the return on each dollar invested in the risky asset and let 1 r be the return on
the risky asset (a random variable.) If the investor spends q on the risky asset (and so Ŵ q on the
riskless asset) her final wealth is
0
ˆ( )(1 ) (1 )W W q r q r
0 0
ˆ (1 ) ( )W r q r r
*
Microeconomic Theory -48- Uncertainty
© John Riley November 12, 2018
7. Portfolio choice
An investor with wealth Ŵ chooses how much to invest in a risky asset and how much in a riskless
asset. Let 1+ 0r be the return on each dollar invested in the risky asset and let 1 r be the return on
the risky asset (a random variable.) If the investor spends q on the risky asset (and so Ŵ q on the
riskless asset) her final wealth is
0
ˆ( )(1 ) (1 )W W q r q r
0 0
ˆ (1 ) ( )W r q r r
0
ˆ (1 )W r q where 0r r .
Class exercise:
What is the simplest possible model that we can use to analyze the investor’s decision?
Microeconomic Theory -49- Uncertainty
© John Riley November 12, 2018
Two state model
Wealth in state , 1,2s s
0
ˆ( )(1 ) (1 )s sW W q r q r
0 0
ˆ (1 ) ( )sW r q r r
ˆ (1 ) sW r q where 0s sr r .
**
Microeconomic Theory -50- Uncertainty
© John Riley November 12, 2018
Two state model
Wealth in state , 1,2s s
0
ˆ( )(1 ) (1 )s sW W q r q r
0 0
ˆ (1 ) ( )sW r q r r
0
ˆ (1 ) sW r q where 0s sr r .
0q
ˆ (1 )sW W r
ˆq W
ˆ ˆ(1 )s sW W r W
*
Microeconomic Theory -51- Uncertainty
© John Riley November 12, 2018
Two state model
Wealth in state , 1,2s s
0
ˆ( )(1 ) (1 )s sW W q r q r
0 0
ˆ (1 ) ( )sW r q r r
ˆ (1 ) sW r q
where 1 1 0 2 0 20r r r r .
0q
ˆ (1 )sW W r
ˆq W
ˆ ˆ(1 )s sW W r W
Expected utility of the investor
1 1 2 2( , ) ( ) ( )U w u W u W
When will the investor purchase some of the risky asset?
Microeconomic Theory -52- Uncertainty
© John Riley November 12, 2018
Two state model
ˆ (1 )s sW W r q where 0s sr r .
The steepness of the boundary of the
set of feasible outcomes is 2
1
**
Microeconomic Theory -53- Uncertainty
© John Riley November 12, 2018
Two state model
ˆ (1 )s sW W r q where 0s sr r .
The steepness of the boundary of the
set of feasible outcomes is 2
1
1 1 2 2( , ) ( ) ( )U W v W v W
The steepness of the level set through
the no risk portfolio is
1
2
NMRS
*
Microeconomic Theory -54- Uncertainty
© John Riley November 12, 2018
Two state model
ˆ (1 )s sW W r q where 0s sr r .
The steepness of the boundary of the
set of feasible outcomes is 2
1
1 1 2 2( , ) ( ) ( )U W v W v W
The steepness of the level set through
the no risk portfolio is
1
2
NMRS
Purchase some of the risky asset as long as 2
1
1
2
i.e. 1 1 2 2 0 .
The risky asset has a higher expected return
Microeconomic Theory -55- Uncertainty
© John Riley November 12, 2018
Calculus approach
1 1 2 2 1 0 1 2 0 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( (1 ) ) ( (1 ) )U q v W v W v W r q v W r q
Where
1 1 0r r and 2 2 0r r
1 1 0 1 2 2 0 2( ) ( (1 ) ) ( (1 ) )U q v W r q v W r q
*
Microeconomic Theory -56- Uncertainty
© John Riley November 12, 2018
Calculus approach
1 1 2 2 1 0 1 2 0 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( (1 ) ) ( (1 ) )U q v W v W v W r q v W r q
Where
1 1 0r r and 2 2 0r r
1 1 0 1 2 2 0 2( ) ( (1 ) ) ( (1 ) )U q v W r q v W r q
Therefore
1 1 0 2 2 0 1 1 2 2 0(0) ( (1 )) ( (1 ) ( ) ( (1 ))U v W r v W r v W r
Thus if 0q , then the marginal gain to investing in the risky asset is strictly positive if and only if
1 1 2 2 0 ,
i.e.
1 1 0 2 2 0 1 1 2 2 0( ) ( ) 0r r r r r r r
i.e. the expected payoff is strictly greater for the risky asset
Class Exercise: Is this still true with more than two states
Microeconomic Theory -57- Uncertainty
© John Riley November 12, 2018
Exercises (for the TA session)
1. Consumer choice
(a) If ( ) lns su x x what is the consumer’s degree of relative risk aversion?
(b) If there are two states, the consumer’s endowment is and the state claims price vector is p ,
solve for the expected utility maximizing consumption.
(c) Confirm that if 1 1
2 2
p
p
then the consumer will purchase more state 2 claims than state 1 claims.
2 . Consumer choice
(a), (b), (c) as in Exercise 1 except that
1/2( )s su x x .
(d) Try to compare the state claims consumption ratio in Exercise 1 with that in Exercise 2.
(e) Provide the intuition for your conclusion.
3. Equilibrium with social risk.
Suppose that both consumers have the same expected utility function
1 1 2 2( , ) ln ln
h h
hU x x x .
The aggregate endowment is 1 2( , ) where 1 2 .
Microeconomic Theory -58- Uncertainty
© John Riley November 12, 2018
(a) Solve for the WE price ratio 1
2
p
p
.
(b) Explain why 1 1
2 2
p
p
.
4. Equilibrium with social risk.
Suppose that both consumers have the same expected utility function
1/2 1/2
1 1 2 2( , ) ( ) ( )
h h
hU x x x .
The aggregate endowment is 1 2( , ) where 1 2 .
(a) Solve for the WE price ratio 1
2
p
p
.
(b) Compare the equilibrium price ratio and allocations in this and the previous exercise and provide
some intuition.