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CM30173: Cryptography\reserved@d =[@let@token art IV

CM30173:
Cryptography

Part IV

The problem:

A key
predistribution
scheme (PKS)

A session key
distribution scheme
(SKDS)

Part IV

The key distribution problem

CM30173:
Cryptography

Part IV

The problem:

A key
predistribution
scheme (PKS)

A session key
distribution scheme
(SKDS)

A key predistribution scheme (PKS)

A session key distribution scheme (SKDS)

CM30173:
Cryptography

Part IV

The problem:

A key
predistribution
scheme (PKS)

A session key
distribution scheme
(SKDS)

The problem:

Throughout the course we have assumed that Alice and
Bob have previously exchanged keys using a secure
channel.

CM30173:
Cryptography

Part IV

The problem:

A key
predistribution
scheme (PKS)

A session key
distribution scheme
(SKDS)

The problem:

Throughout the course we have assumed that Alice and
Bob have previously exchanged keys using a secure
channel. This implies:

That Alice and Bob are already known to each
other

That Alice and Bob have foreseen that they will
wish to communicate securely in the future

That Alice and Bob are able to store the key
information securely

CM30173:
Cryptography

Part IV

The problem:

A key
predistribution
scheme (PKS)

A session key
distribution scheme
(SKDS)

The problem:

Throughout the course we have assumed that Alice and
Bob have previously exchanged keys using a secure
channel. This implies:

That Alice and Bob are already known to each
other

That Alice and Bob have foreseen that they will
wish to communicate securely in the future

That Alice and Bob are able to store the key
information securely

This is unrealistic for widespread business or personal
use.

CM30173:
Cryptography

Part IV

The problem:

A key
predistribution
scheme (PKS)

A session key
distribution scheme
(SKDS)

Distributing private keys

We will consider two ways that an organisation might
distribute keys:

1 A key predistribution scheme

2 A session key distribution scheme

CM30173:
Cryptography

Part IV

The problem:

A key
predistribution
scheme (PKS)

A session key
distribution scheme
(SKDS)

A key predistribution scheme (PKS)

A session key distribution scheme (SKDS)

CM30173:
Cryptography

Part IV

The problem:

A key
predistribution
scheme (PKS)

A session key
distribution scheme
(SKDS)

A key predistribution scheme (PKS)

Definition

A trusted authority distributes keying information
in advance

Keying information is distributed using secure
channels

Keying information might be long lived keys or
secret information that can later be used to
produce keys

CM30173:
Cryptography

Part IV

The problem:

A key
predistribution
scheme (PKS)

A session key
distribution scheme
(SKDS)

A key predistribution scheme (PKS)

A session key distribution scheme (SKDS)

CM30173:
Cryptography

Part IV

The problem:

A key
predistribution
scheme (PKS)

A session key
distribution scheme
(SKDS)

A session key distribution scheme (SKDS)

Definition

A session key scheme involves a trusted authority
and two users, Alice and Bob, who wish to
communicate.

The objective is the production of a session key
known only to Alice and Bob (and possibly the TA).

Session keys are used to encrypt information for a
specified, short period of time.

Often each network user will share a di!erent long
lived key with the TA.

CM30173:
Cryptography

Part IV

New directions in
cryptography
Idea 1: A public-key
cryptosystem
Idea 2: A signature
scheme
Idea 3: Public-key
distribution scheme

RSA

Mathematical
background

Part V

Public-key cryptography

CM30173:
Cryptography

Part IV

New directions in
cryptography
Idea 1: A public-key
cryptosystem
Idea 2: A signature
scheme
Idea 3: Public-key
distribution scheme

RSA

Mathematical
background

New directions in cryptography

Idea 1: A public-key cryptosystem

Idea 2: A signature scheme

Idea 3: Public-key distribution scheme

RSA

Mathematical background

CM30173:
Cryptography

Part IV

New directions in
cryptography
Idea 1: A public-key
cryptosystem
Idea 2: A signature
scheme
Idea 3: Public-key
distribution scheme

RSA

Mathematical
background

1976: Di!e and Hellman

“We stand today on the brink of a
revolution in cryptography.”

CM30173:
Cryptography

Part IV

New directions in
cryptography
Idea 1: A public-key
cryptosystem
Idea 2: A signature
scheme
Idea 3: Public-key
distribution scheme

RSA

Mathematical
background

1976: Di!e and Hellman

“We stand today on the brink of a
revolution in cryptography.”

Gave an abstract way of providing secure
communication between two people who had not
met or exchanged securely a secret key.

Argued how such a system could also provide
secure digital signatures.

Gave a practical method by which two people,
without the aid of a trusted authority, can establish
a shared secret key using an insecure channel.

CM30173:
Cryptography

Part IV

New directions in
cryptography
Idea 1: A public-key
cryptosystem
Idea 2: A signature
scheme
Idea 3: Public-key
distribution scheme

RSA

Mathematical
background

New directions in cryptography

Idea 1: A public-key cryptosystem

Idea 2: A signature scheme

Idea 3: Public-key distribution scheme

RSA

Mathematical background

CM30173:
Cryptography

Part IV

New directions in
cryptography
Idea 1: A public-key
cryptosystem
Idea 2: A signature
scheme
Idea 3: Public-key
distribution scheme

RSA

Mathematical
background

A public-key cryptosystem

Definition

A public-key cryptosystem is a cryptosystem
(P, C,K, E ,D) where

1 For every k ! K, ek is the inverse of dk
2 For every k ! K and for every x ! P or y ! C,

ek(x) and dk(y) are easy to compute

3 It is computationally infeasible (for almost all
k ! K) to derive dk from ek

4 For every k ! K it is feasible to compute ek and dk
from k

CM30173:
Cryptography

Part IV

New directions in
cryptography
Idea 1: A public-key
cryptosystem
Idea 2: A signature
scheme
Idea 3: Public-key
distribution scheme

RSA

Mathematical
background

Recall Alice and Bob

Alice Bob

Oscar

PlaintextPlaintext

Encryption Decryption

Unsecured channel
ek(x) = y dk(y) = x

CM30173:
Cryptography

Part IV

New directions in
cryptography
Idea 1: A public-key
cryptosystem
Idea 2: A signature
scheme
Idea 3: Public-key
distribution scheme

RSA

Mathematical
background

Private-key cryptosystems

Alice Bob

Oscar

PlaintextPlaintext

Encryption Decryption

Unsecured channel

Secure channel

ek(x) = y dk(y) = x

k

k

xx

Key source

CM30173:
Cryptography

Part IV

New directions in
cryptography
Idea 1: A public-key
cryptosystem
Idea 2: A signature
scheme
Idea 3: Public-key
distribution scheme

RSA

Mathematical
background

Public-key cryptosystem

Alice Bob

Oscar

PlaintextPlaintext

Encryption Decryption

Unsecured channel

Unsecured channel
ek(x) = y dk(y) = x

ek
dk

xx

Key source

CM30173:
Cryptography

Part IV

New directions in
cryptography
Idea 1: A public-key
cryptosystem
Idea 2: A signature
scheme
Idea 3: Public-key
distribution scheme

RSA

Mathematical
background

Trap-door one-way function

Definition (One-way function)

A one-way function is a function f : X ” Y such that
for all x ! X it is easy to compute f(x) but for
(almost) all y ! Y it is computationally infeasible to
find an x such that f(x) = y.

CM30173:
Cryptography

Part IV

New directions in
cryptography
Idea 1: A public-key
cryptosystem
Idea 2: A signature
scheme
Idea 3: Public-key
distribution scheme

RSA

Mathematical
background

Trap-door one-way function

Definition (One-way function)

A one-way function is a function f : X ” Y such that
for all x ! X it is easy to compute f(x) but for
(almost) all y ! Y it is computationally infeasible to
find an x such that f(x) = y.

Definition (Trap-door one-way function)

A trap-door one-way function is a one-way function
f : X ” Y such that given some additional trap-door
information it becomes feasible, for all y ! Y to find
x ! X such that y = f(x).

CM30173:
Cryptography

Part IV

New directions in
cryptography
Idea 1: A public-key
cryptosystem
Idea 2: A signature
scheme
Idea 3: Public-key
distribution scheme

RSA

Mathematical
background

And what about security?

Task: Recall the definitions from lecture 2 and consider
if they are still relevant.

CM30173:
Cryptography

Part IV

New directions in
cryptography
Idea 1: A public-key
cryptosystem
Idea 2: A signature
scheme
Idea 3: Public-key
distribution scheme

RSA

Mathematical
background

And what about security?

Task: Recall the definitions from lecture 2 and consider
if they are still relevant.

Clearly a public-key cryptosystem can never be
unconditionally secure.

CM30173:
Cryptography

Part IV

New directions in
cryptography
Idea 1: A public-key
cryptosystem
Idea 2: A signature
scheme
Idea 3: Public-key
distribution scheme

RSA

Mathematical
background

And what about security?

Task: Recall the definitions from lecture 2 and consider
if they are still relevant.

Clearly a public-key cryptosystem can never be
unconditionally secure.

Alice looks up Bob’s public key function ek and
encrypts x: y = ek(x).

Oscar encrypts each possible message in turn until
he finds the unique x such that y = ek(x).

CM30173:
Cryptography

Part IV

New directions in
cryptography
Idea 1: A public-key
cryptosystem
Idea 2: A signature
scheme
Idea 3: Public-key
distribution scheme

RSA

Mathematical
background

And what about security?

Task: Recall the definitions from lecture 2 and consider
if they are still relevant.

Clearly a public-key cryptosystem can never be
unconditionally secure.

Alice looks up Bob’s public key function ek and
encrypts x: y = ek(x).

Oscar encrypts each possible message in turn until
he finds the unique x such that y = ek(x).

Note that Oscar can always launch a chosen-plaintext
attack.

The key distribution problem
A key predistribution scheme (PKS)
A session key distribution scheme (SKDS)

Public-key cryptography
New directions in cryptography
Idea 1: A public-key cryptosystem
Idea 2: A signature scheme
Idea 3: Public-key distribution scheme

RSA
Mathematical background