10/21/2019 CSCI 561 (139 unread) question 407 views hint about the problem This problem is so hard.. Can we get some hint like hint about TA’s solution? Updated 13 days ago by Anonymous the students’ answer, where students collectively construct a single answer @210 The goal is to implement minimax with alpha beta pruning. I […]
CS代考程序代写 algorithm 10/21/2019 CSCI 561 (139 unread) Read More »
Student ID: Last Name: First Name: USC email: Instructions: samplequestionsf14–2 #1 1 of 10 Practice Midterm Examination CSCI 561 FALL2014: Artificial Intelligence Rubric is not provided. You are welcome to discuss your answers to this exam on Piazza, and to all together come up with an agreed solution. We will help you if needed. Please
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Cryptography Basics – Public Key Cryptography ECEN 4133 FEB 4, 2021 Shared key limitations Suppose Alice publishes data to lots of people, and they all want to verify integrity… Can’t share an integrity key with everybody, or else anybody could forge messages Suppose Bob wants to receive data from lots of people, confidentially… Schemes we’ve
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Cryptography Basics – Key exchange Review Integrity: prevent Mallory from tampering v’ == MACk(m’) k Bob k Bob p := Dk(c) ◦ Message Authentication Code ◦ Hashes -> HMAC ◦ Use: SHA2, SHA3 k m, v:= MAC (m) k m’, v’ Confidentiality: prevent eavesdropper (Eve) from learning the (plaintext) message ◦ Streamciphers ◦ AES-CTR, ChaCha20
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Cryptography basics – Integrity: Hashes and MACs ECEN 4133 Jan 19, 2021 Alice and Bob Alice wants to send message m to Bob ◦ Can’t fully trust the messenger or network carrying the message ◦ Want to be sure what Bob receives is actually what Alice sent ✉✉ Alice Mallory Bob Threat model: ◦ Mallory
CS代考程序代写 algorithm Cryptography basics – Integrity: Hashes and MACs Read More »
Cryptography Basics – Key exchange Review Integrity: prevent Mallory from tampering v’ == MACk(m’) k Bob k Bob p := Dk(c) ◦ Message Authentication Code ◦ Hashes -> HMAC ◦ Use: SHA2, SHA3 k m, v:= MAC (m) k m’, v’ Confidentiality: prevent eavesdropper (Eve) from learning the (plaintext) message ◦ Streamciphers ◦ AES-CTR, ChaCha20
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Cryptography basics – Integrity: Hashes and MACs ECEN 4133 Jan 19, 2021 Alice and Bob Alice wants to send message m to Bob ◦ Can’t fully trust the messenger or network carrying the message ◦ Want to be sure what Bob receives is actually what Alice sent ✉✉ Alice Mallory Bob Threat model: ◦ Mallory
CS代考程序代写 algorithm Cryptography basics – Integrity: Hashes and MACs Read More »
Cryptography Basics – Public Key Cryptography ECEN 4133 FEB 4, 2021 Shared key limitations Suppose Alice publishes data to lots of people, and they all want to verify integrity… Can’t share an integrity key with everybody, or else anybody could forge messages Suppose Bob wants to receive data from lots of people, confidentially… Schemes we’ve
CS代考程序代写 scheme algorithm Cryptography Basics – Public Key Cryptography Read More »
Public-Key Crypto Review: Integrity Problem: Sending a message over an untrusted channel without being changed Provably-secure solution: Random function Practical solution: m, v := fk(m) Mallory m’, v’ =? fk(m’) e.g. “Attack at dawn”, 628369867… Pseudorandom function (PRF) Input: arbitrary-length k Output: fixed-length value Secure if practically indistinguishable from a random function, unless know k
CS代考程序代写 scheme algorithm Public-Key Crypto Read More »
Public-Key Crypto Review: Integrity Problem: Sending a message over an untrusted channel without being changed Provably-secure solution: Random function Practical solution: m, v := fk(m) Mallory m’, v’ =? fk(m’) e.g. “Attack at dawn”, 628369867… Pseudorandom function (PRF) Input: arbitrary-length k Output: fixed-length value Secure if practically indistinguishable from a random function, unless know k
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